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old-fashioned) Swinburnian apologetics for the coherence of Christian 
beliefs and Plantingian responses to fideism or the more newfangled 
developments regularly appearing in issues of this journal. Attending to 
the literature might have staved off the many conflations and confusions 
in the book about the rational entitlements of Christians in their religious 
beliefs that forms the proper background against which to judge whether 
some putative theological justification can be judged to be a good or 
bad one.
Given these serious defects, I cannot commend McClendon’s book as a 
worthwhile philosophical analysis or evaluation of black Christology. For 
those SCP readers who wish to become more familiar with that literature 
Black Christology and the Quest for Authenticity is an unreliable guide. For 
those readers of Faith and Philosophy who wish to constructively engage 
with the theological project of black Christology, we must await a more 
fruitful treatment to fill the gap identified by this book. That is not to say, 
however, that McClendon’s book is wholly without merits. While under-
developed, the four criticisms I’ve distilled above represent potentially 
pressing problems that merit careful reflection from advocates of black 
Christology. Teasing out the particular shape that such problems might 
take remains important work, but it is work that remains to be done.
The Design Argument, by Elliot Sober. Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
Pp. 94. $18.00 (paperback).
JOHN A. KELLER, St. Joseph’s University
Elliott Sober’s The Design Argument is, in many ways, a fine little book. 
I certainly enjoyed and benefited from reading it and thinking about the 
issues raised within. It’s important to note, however, that the book is an 
extremely opinionated introduction to the biological and cosmic design 
arguments. The restrictive word limit for the Cambridge Elements series 
surely played a role here: when there’s not space to cover everything, one’s 
particular judgements about what is most worth covering make a bigger 
difference. Still, there are places where I think the perspective represented 
in the book is at odds with the state of the literature.
The brief introductory chapter was quite nice. Sober gives a quick but 
interesting history of design arguments and lays the terminological and 
conceptual groundwork for what follows. Two of Sober’s choices here are 
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important later: he defines “God” as the intentional creator of the uni-
verse, and claims that design arguments are intended to be
part of natural theology, not revealed theology . . . They do not appeal to the 
authority of sacred texts or traditions. Design arguments are intended to 
obey the same rules that govern scientific arguments (2).
This way of setting things up rules out design arguments’ appealing to 
(purported) facts about God—e.g., that God is good—that follow from 
scripture and tradition (or from the idea that God is a perfect being) but 
not from the mere claim that God intentionally created the universe.
The primer on probability theory in Chapter 2 was clear, concise, and 
engagingly written, but a few more diagrams would have been helpful, 
especially for the uninitiated. I  had some questions about the intended 
audience for the book in general—I had initially assumed that it was under-
graduate students—but those questions were particularly acute here. While 
the primer is only sixteen pages long, it is quite dense: too dense, I think, to 
be used easily and effectively in the classroom. It would take at least three 
weeks to teach the material in the primer to undergraduates unfamiliar 
with probability theory, and instructors would need to provide supplemen-
tary explanations, readings, and practice exercises. By my lights, the chapter 
is also too compressed to serve as an effective introduction to probability 
theory for anyone. It would be most useful for readers who have some famil-
iarity with probability theory but who could use a refresher. This, to be fair, 
describes a fair number of philosophers of religion.
In Chapter 3, Sober considers six ways of formulating design argu-
ments: (i) as significance tests, (ii) as inductive inferences, (iii) as analogi-
cal arguments, (iv) in Bayesian terms, (v) in likelihoodist terms, and (vi) as 
inferences to the best explanation.
According to Sober, likelihoodism is the best of these frameworks. 
I largely agreed with Sober’s criticisms of argument forms (i)-(iii) and (vi), 
but I was a bit surprised that Sober chose likelihoodism as the framework 
for the book, given that Bayesianism is more familiar to more people. 
(Bayesianism is derided for its reliance on ur-priors: a priori probability 
assignments not based on experience.) Anyone familiar with Bayesianism 
should be able to easily understand likelihoodist arguments, however: 
likelihoodism is essentially a restricted form of Bayesianism that eschews 
ur-priors and “catchall hypotheses” (disunited negations of real or uni-
fied hypotheses). As Sober says, “there are two reasons why likelihoodists 
aren’t Bayesians: they often don’t want to talk about the prior and poste-
rior probabilities of theories and they often don’t want to talk about the 
likelihoods of catchalls” (22).
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the biological design argument. Sober uses 
“Pr(X)” to express the probability that X is true, and “Pr(X|Y)” to express 
the probability of X given Y. In those terms, what Sober calls the “Law of 
Likelihood” says that evidence E favors hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2 
iff Pr(E|H1) > Pr(E|H2).
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Sober gives the following objection to likelihoodist arguments from 
biological design:
Suppose a design argument asserted that
Pr(vertebrates have eyes that have features F1|God gave organisms their 
features) > Pr(vertebrates have eyes that have features F1|mindless natu-
ral selection caused organisms to have their features)
The problem I have with this claim is that there is no saying whether the 
first of these probabilities is big, middling, or small . . . This point about the 
God hypothesis, if correct, is fatal to likelihood versions of the biological 
design argument, regardless of whether evolutionary theory is able to say 
how probable it is that vertebrates have eyes that have features F1 (42).
This problem—the problem of determining God’s goals and the concomi-
tant likelihoods of God doing various things (like ensuring that vertebrates 
have eyes with features F1, or fine-tuning the constants)—comes up again 
later. I argue below that the problem of God’s goals isn’t as “fatal” as Sober 
suggests, and hence that the cogency of the objection here does depend on 
the probability of evolution producing features F1. Nonetheless, I  agree 
with Sober that in fact this probability is high enough to undermine likeli-
hoodist arguments from biological design.
I was, however, taken aback by Sober’s suggestion that deleterious 
traits are not evidence against intelligent design. He says,
This Darwinian argument against intelligent design is flawed. If a trait’s 
being neutral or deleterious favors evolutionary theory over the God 
hypothesis [biological-design hypothesis], then a trait’s being advantageous 
must have the opposite evidential significance . . . However, few evolution-
ists would want to concede that a trait’s being advantageous favors the God 
hypothesis over the hypothesis of mindless evolution, and they are right to 
resist that conclusion (49).
This can easily be read in a way that is dangerously misleading. Some 
people are pleased to say that there’s no evidence for the existence of 
God. An important fact about (standard) probabilistic theories of con-
firmation is that this just isn’t true: there will be all sorts of evidence for 
all sorts of claims, including the “God hypothesis.” And advantageous 
traits are evidence for the God hypothesis—at least on many standard 
definitions of “God”—for precisely the reason Sober discusses. They’re 
just not significant evidence, since they don’t significantly favor the God 
hypothesis (neither simpliciter nor over evolution). Consider: if I received 
a news update saying that Trump had admitted to collusion and resigned, 
I’d gain significant evidence for collusion. It follows that when I don’t 
receive such a news update, I’ve gained evidence against collusion. That 
might seem radically counterintuitive or stupid, but it just falls out of 
standard theories of probabilistic confirmation. But while the confirma-
tion provided by receiving such a news update would be significant, the 
disconfirmation from not receiving one is insignificant. Indeed, it’s minis-
cule—miniscule enough that it seems silly to mention it. And it is silly to 
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mention it, except in contexts where we’re asking, in the strict and phil-
osophical sense, about what evidence there is. Just so, deleterious traits 
are (perhaps significant) evidence against the biological-design hypothe-
sis, and hence advantageous traits are evidence for the God hypothesis. 
It doesn’t follow, however, that they’re significant evidence, and indeed 
they’re not, since both the God hypothesis and evolution entail that most 
traits are advantageous. But even if the discovery of advantageous traits 
is merely insignificant evidence for the God hypothesis, it is evidence. Of 
course, the relevant question is whether there are any “observations that 
favor the God hypothesis over the hypothesis of natural selection” (56). 
But the discovery of advantageous traits is evidence favoring the God 
hypothesis over natural selection if the probability that a trait will be 
advantageous is higher given the God hypothesis than it is given evolu-
tion. Since  evolution works by trial and error and God is omniscient, that 
seems rather plausible.
None of the above entails, or even suggests, that our observations of the 
traits of organisms, taken as a whole, favor the God hypothesis over evo-
lution—I agree with Sober that they don’t. But that doesn’t justify saying 
that there are no observations favoring the God hypothesis over evolution 
at all. That’s just not true, and it gives a misleading impression of how 
to think about evidence in probabilistic terms. We shouldn’t spend time 
debating whether there’s any evidence that favors one view over another. 
That’s silly: pretty much every (non-gerrymandered) view has some evi-
dence that favors it over incompatible (non-gerrymandered) views. What 
we should care about, the only thing we should care about, is which view 
is best supported by the total evidence.
Sober knows all this, of course: indeed, he has a nice article on issues 
in the neighborhood (“Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: 
Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-Tuning, 
and Firing Squads,” Philosophical Studies 143 (2009): 63–90). It’s his 
restricted definition of “God” that is doing all the work here. As he says,
I provisionally defined “God” as a being who intentionally created the uni-
verse. This definition leaves open whether God is all-PKG [all powerful, 
knowing, and good]. In consequence, the existence of imperfect adaptations, 
of neutral and deleterious traits, and of evils aplenty all fail to prove that 
God does not exist. (51)
While proof is beside the point—what’s at issue is evidence against God’s 
existence—deleterious traits etc. plausibly fail to even qualify as evidence 
against Sober’s “God,” since that God is defined merely as the (possibly 
incompetent or malicious) creator of the universe. One might think that 
this suggests that we should use a richer conception of God for assessing 
our evidence. Sober, however, says that while taking God to be all-PKG is
an assumption that many atheists and theists embrace . . . why should this 
assumption about God’s characteristics be accepted? Does the assumption 
have independent justification? (51)
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This strikes me as an odd way of framing things. It’s not that we’re really 
only interested in whether a (possibly incompetent or malicious) creator 
of the universe exists, and are illicitly assuming the creator is all-PKG 
just to bolster certain theological (or atheological) arguments. Christians, 
Muslims, and Jews believed in an all-PKG creator before anybody knew 
about deleterious traits (or fine-tuning). So it’s natural—indeed commend-
able—to want to know the evidential significance of deleterious traits (or 
fine-tuning) for an all-PKG creator.
Sober’s objection to this is that while the idea of God being all-PKG is 
“part of some religion [sic] traditions . . . sacred texts and traditions have 
no place in natural theology” (51). But this is just to insist that God’s being 
all-PKG is an auxiliary assumption to the hypothesis under evaluation. But 
why can’t we evaluate the hypothesis that there’s an all-PKG creator, and 
do natural theology with respect to that—especially if that’s what we’re 
interested in anyway? Sober suggests at various places that this might be 
illicitly “packing” the observations we want to explain into the hypothesis 
with which we hope to explain them. While there certainly are illicit forms 
of “packing in,” given that God was defined to be all-PKG long before the 
discovery of deleterious traits or fine-tuning, it’s hard for me to see how 
this could be one.
In the final chapter of the book, Sober discusses the Fine-Tuning 
Argument (FTA). He presents it in terms of the following inequality:
Pr(the value of physical constant x is in W|God set the value of x & W is nar-
row) > Pr(the value of physical constant x is in W|a mindless chance process 
set the value of x & W is narrow).
Sober has two main objections to the FTA. As he puts it, “The first focuses 
on the FTA’s assumption that God is life-loving. I see no way to provide 
that assumption with independent justification. The second . . . is that the 
FTA is vitiated by an observation selection effect” (76).
The first objection is the problem of God’s goals again: if we don’t 
know that God is life-loving, we don’t know how likely it is that God 
would fine-tune the laws, and so (the thought goes) we don’t know 
whether that’s more likely than that the laws were fine-tuned by chance. 
That might seem plausible, at least if we don’t know the probability of 
the laws being fine-tuned by chance. It’s curious that Sober doesn’t actu-
ally mention what that probability is. Physicists say that the probability 
of the cosmological constant alone being in the life-permitting range is 
something like 1/10120. That is astronomically low. In fact, calling it astro-
nomically low is an understatement. There are about 1021 stars in the 
known universe. That’s nowhere close to 10120. The number of atoms in 
the universe is about 1080. Still nowhere close. A credence that God would 
want to fine-tune the universe for rational life that was anywhere in the 
neighborhood of 1/10120 would correspond to utter certitude that God 
wouldn’t want to do that. I’m utterly certain that I won’t win the next 
five Powerball lotteries, but the probability of that is much higher than 
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1/10120. So, as long as we’re not utterly certain about what God wouldn’t 
want, ordinary uncertainty about what God would want doesn’t under-
mine the FTA. This response is well represented in the literature, so it’s 
odd that Sober doesn’t mention it. If Sober thinks the response is mis-
taken, it would be nice to be told why. And while we’re at it, it would 
be nice to be told what’s wrong with asking about the evidential impact 
of fine-tuning on the life-loving god worshipped in the Abrahamic tra-
ditions—which would simply bypass the problem of God’s goals—other 
than that it wouldn’t count as “natural theology.” Natural theology or 
not, it seems like an interesting and important question. (Neil A. Manson 
pushes back against the “utter certainty” defense of the FTA in “How Not 
to be Generous to Fine-Tuning Sceptics” (Religious Studies, 2018). But my 
aim isn’t to be generous to fine-tuning sceptics: I’m not trying to grant 
them their premises and argue that the FTA works nonetheless. I’m just 
trying to figure out what premises are true.)
Sober’s second objection postulates an observation selection effect that 
undermines the FTA. To account for such effects, Sober claims that we 
should adopt the “Revised Law of Likelihood”:
Given that P is true, where P is a proposition describing the process by 
which the observation was obtained, observation O favors hypothesis H1 
over hypothesis H2 if and only if Pr(O|H1&P) > Pr(O|H2&P).
Given this revision, Sober maintains that the FTA hinges on the relation-
ship between:
Pr(the value of physical constant x is in W|God set the value of x & W is 
narrow & P) and
Pr(the value of physical constant x is in W|a mindless chance process set the 
value of x & W is narrow & P).
Sober claims that these probabilities are the same, since P entails that we 
are alive, which entails that the value of x is in W. As he puts it, “Given 
that you are alive, the probability of your observing that the constants are 
right is the same, regardless of whether the God hypothesis or the chance 
hypothesis is true” (70).
This might be true if by “the constants are right” we mean “the con-
stants are life-permitting” (as Sober glosses things (75)). But we’ve always 
known that the constants are life-permitting: if W is the life-permitting 
range, we’ve known that the constants are in W since we formulated the 
idea of a physical constant. The basis for the FTA is that the constants are 
in W, and that W is incredibly, unfathomably, narrow. So “W is narrow” 
should be on the left side, with the evidence, not the right side, as part of 
the hypothesis. This is important because if “W is narrow” belongs on the 
left, the FTA hinges on the relationship between:
Pr(the value of physical constant x is in W & W is narrow|God set the value 
of x & P)
and
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Pr(the value of physical constant x is in W & W is narrow|a mindless chance 
process set the value of x & P).
And if that’s right, nothing about P (the process by which we discovered 
that x is in W and W is narrow) suggests that the first probability isn’t 
larger than the second. We might have discovered—we expected to dis-
cover—laws that didn’t need fine-tuning. (Sober himself asks why God 
didn’t create such laws if God likes life so much.) But, in fact, we discov-
ered laws that don’t permit life to exist across a wide range of values for 
their constants. That fact is crucial to the FTA. And so there isn’t an obser-
vation selection effect generated by the fact that we’re alive. Sober seems 
to acknowledge this (n. 74), and notes in response that this alternative 
formulation of the FTA still faces the problem of God’s goals. Maybe so (or 
maybe not), but wouldn’t it make sense to focus on the strongest version 
of the FTA in the main text?
The last two pages of the book discuss the “multiverse objection,” 
widely taken to be the most powerful objection to the FTA. Given the sig-
nificance of the objection in the literature, it’s striking that Sober’s dis-
cussion is so brief, and that some of the most important responses to the 
objection are not considered. I found this odd, and odd in a way emblem-
atic of the book as a whole.
I really did enjoy reading The Design Argument. There are lucid and 
enlightening discussions of many aspects of the biological and cosmic 
design arguments. But there are also peculiar decisions about what gets 
covered, and how things get covered, and how much things get covered, 
and what objections to what get covered. Such decisions are unavoid-
able: the book is short and wide-ranging. But the particular decisions 
Sober makes paint an idiosyncratic picture of the state of the literature. 
Of course, it would be unreasonable to expect Sober to agree with me 
about the exact state of the debate. But it doesn’t seem unreasonable to 
expect that, having read a book on design arguments, one would (for 
example) be familiar with the suggestion that uncertainty about God’s 
goals is compatible with the FTA, and have a sense of the centrality of, 
and complexities surrounding, the multiverse objection. Neither topic 
needs to be extensively discussed, especially if Sober thinks them periph-
eral. But some footnotes acknowledging the controversy in the literature 
would have been appropriate. So while I  think The Design Argument is 
an excellent introduction to Sober’s work on design arguments—and 
his work on design arguments is important indeed—it’s worth keeping 
in mind that it’s a partisan and non-comprehensive introduction to the 
overall state of the literature on design arguments themselves. (Thanks to 
Nevin Climenhaga, Joseph Corabi, Lorraine Juliano Keller, Neil Manson, 
Andrew Payne, Steve Petersen, Daniel Rubio, and especially Elliott Sober 
for helpful feedback.)
Morality and Situation Ethics, by Dietrich von Hildebrand with Alice von 
Hildebrand. Hildebrand Press, 2019. Pp. xxxviii + 180. $16.99 (paperback).
CATHERINE NOLAN, University of Dallas
This newly republished book, originally available in 1955, is an example 
of a text which proves its worth by its continued relevance today, and in 
circumstances that its author could not have anticipated.
Morality and Situation Ethics has as its primary aim to point out the 
flaws of situation ethics, which is the theory that there are no exceptionless 
moral rules and that “[t]he morally good is what our conscience tells us to 
do in a unique case when we examine all factors before God” (143). I will 
summarize this argument in the first part of this review. Von Hildebrand’s 
descriptions can be used to illuminate new situations, however, so I will 
explore a contemporary application of his work in my second section. 
Finally, I will discuss some limitations of the text before summarizing its 
highlights.
Because von Hildebrand began to formulate his arguments against 
situation ethics before Joseph Fletcher published its manifesto, Situation 
Ethics: The New Morality, in 1966, von Hildebrand is criticizing an implicit 
theory or “moral mentality” which he finds in literature rather than in aca-
demic philosophy or theology. He frames the debate by describing kinds 
of moral characters, which he relates to characters in classic works of fic-
tion. The primary contrast used by those who endorse situation ethics, 
von Hildebrand claims, is between the “pharisee” and the “tragic sinner.” 
The pharisee seeks to obey God, but only as the source of a set of rules 
that give him moral superiority over others rather than as an infinitely 
holy and mysterious being deserving of our love and adoration. The phar-
isee, therefore, opposes the spirit of the law—the true meaning of a law, 
considered in the context of the rest of morality—in order to follow the 
letter of the law—a misinterpreted and isolated law which serves to ele-
vate him and with which he judges others harshly and without mercy. The 
situation ethicist is rightly repulsed by such an attitude, and proposes as 
an alternate ideal the tragic sinner: one who is fully aware of his own sin 
but suffers because it separates him from God, for whom he has a deep 
longing. This leads the situation ethicist to a “sin mysticism” which con-
dones—or even glorifies—actions traditionally considered sinful if they 
are performed by someone of a generally moral character who is relying 
on God’s mercy. Sin is, in these cases, seen as protecting the sinner from 
pharisaical pride (91). Von Hildebrand emphasizes that the term “sin” in 
the context of this work is not intended to imply anything about the state 
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